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Abstract 
Mutual recognition is one of the most appreciated innovations of the EU. The idea is that 
one can pursue market integration, indeed "deep' market integration, while respecting 
'diversity' amongst the participating countries. Put differently, in pursuing 'free movement' 
for goods, mutual recognition facilitates free movement by disciplining the nature and scope 
of 'regulatory barriers', whilst allowing some degree of regulatory discretion for EU Member 
States.  
This BEER paper attempts to explain the rationale and logic of mutual recognition in the EU 
internal goods market, its working in actual practice for about three decades now, 
culminating in a qualitative cost/benefit analysis and its recent improvement in terms of 
'governance' in the so-called New Legislative Framework (first denoted as the 2008 Goods 
package) thereby ameliorating the benefits/costs ratio. For new (in contrast to existing) 
national regulation, the intrusive EU procedure to impose mutual recognition is presented as 
well, with basic data so as to show its critical importance to keep the internal goods market 
free. All this is complemented by a short summary of the scant economic literature on 
mutual recognition. Subsequently, the analysis is extended to the internal market for 
services. This is done in two steps, first by reminding the debate on the origin principle 
(which goes further than mutual recognition EU-style) and how mutual recognition works 
under the horizontal services directive. This is followed by a short section on how mutual 
recognition works in vertical (i.e. sectoral) services markets. 
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1.    Introduction and purpose 
Mutual recognition is one of the most appreciated innovations of the EU. The idea is that one can 
pursue market integration, indeed "deep" market integration, while respecting 'diversity' amongst 
the participating countries. Put differently, in pursuing 'free movement' for goods in the EU internal 
market and hence going beyond merely removing tariffs and quotas, Mutual Recognition facilitates 
free movement by disciplining the nature and scope of 'regulatory barriers', whilst allowing some 
degree of regulatory discretion for the EU Member States. Compared to alternative options of 
'deepening' market integration, this solution is attractive and, in principle, welfare increasing. Mutual 
recognition might also be appreciated because, in avoiding EU regulation, it tends to limit 
centralisation, while facilitating 'regulatory competition' between Member States and, possibly, 
lower the costs of the incredible regulatory heterogeneity business faces in the EU internal market. 
Nevertheless, mutual recognition (= MR)  is many things to many people. 1 2 The present contribution 
will not cast the net so wide. The focus will be on the successful and far-reaching examples of the EU 
internal market for goods  and services. 
 
The paper attempts to explain the (1) rationale and logic of mutual recognition in the EU internal 
goods market (section 2 ), (2) its working in actual practice in the EU for more than 25 years, 
culminating in a qualitative benefit / cost analysis (section 4)  and (3) its recent improvement in 
terms of 'governance' in the so-called 2008 Goods package (section 5), thereby ameliorating the 
benefits / costs ratio. Lest it be forgotten, mutual recognition in the EU ought to be applied both to 
existing national regulation and new national regulation emerging from the Member States. For the 
latter, the EU has created an intrusive mechanism 
which has successfully protected the internal goods market from serious erosion over time (section 
3). . Where possible and useful, this chapter will refer to notions sometimes seen, particularly by 
economists, as closely related to mutual recognition such as regulatory competition and 'better' 
                                                 
1  In the literature one finds that MR is a rule about conflicts of law between 2 or more countries, or a rule 
of choice concerning what country law applies, or, simply (functional) 'equivalence', or, a form of 
'decentralized policing'. Authors distinguish 'pure', 'rootless'  and 'managed' MR from  (just) 'recognition', 
to mention only some examples. 
2 MR can be very limited in scope, too,  and this might not always be appreciated. Thus, WTO promotes 
mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) but all they do is to underpin MR solely for conformity assessment 
of a trading partner's technical requirements of a good (for purposes of im/export). The disappointment 
about making  MRAs work effectively in world trade, despite their limited scope, can be better understood 
when understanding how the EU has solved quality requirements and mutual trust in this sensitive 
domain. However, this is a very demanding regime, perhaps too intrusive for many WTO partners. See e.g. 
section 5 and the references there.  
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regulation. The scant economic theory of MR is summarized in a Box in section 4. It will be shown 
that mutual recognition, rather than being inspired by academic theory,  has emerged from the 
profound frustrations in EU circles about the first two decades of the internal market.  Sections 6 and 
7 attempt to extend the analysis to services. The former will show how the application of MR has 
spilled over from goods to services markets, culminating in the debate about a horizontal 
liberalisation directive (the Bolkestein draft of 2004) and the later services directive 2006/123. The 
meaning for the internal services market is not yet fully clear,  as will be shown. Section 7 will briefly 
set out MR as applied in vertical (i.e. sectoral) services directives, with some examples. Section 8 
concludes. 
 
2.   Rationale and logic of mutual recognition 
2.1   The fundamental problem 
 
The EU first established a customs union in the period 1958 – 1968. Internally, it implies 'free trade', 
the removal of all tariffs and quotas. Further deepening of goods market integration is required by 
the treaty because, unlike the WTO, the treaty incorporates the obligation to establish 'free 
movement'. Free movement implies the 'right' for EU economic agents to move goods (or, services, 
as the case might be) into any national market in the EU, that is, to have unhindered market access. 
This concept is therefore much more radical than free trade as such. That right overrides the powers 
of EU Member States to put in place or maintain any access barrier, except if and insofar as the 
treaty specifies such instances or allows for certain derogations of free movement.  
In more general economic parlance, free movement goes beyond free trade in that non-tariff barriers 
are forbidden or made irrelevant. Radical as that certainly is, free movement is not unlimited or 
unconditional. Simplifying, Member States may have two types of non-tariff barriers : those that 
cannot be justified by market failures or exceptions to the internal market (such as national security 
or public order) and those that can be justified. The design of the treaty, subsequent case law and 
secondary legislation (like Directives) should effectively eliminate the former, sooner or later. But 
what about the latter ?  In traditional thinking, there are three ways of addressing 'justified' national 
interventions in their markets causing access barriers: national treatment, prohibitions and 
harmonisation. 3 Each one has drawbacks. If one wishes to protect the national regulatory autonomy 
(perhaps assuming that national regulation and other interventionism faithfully expresses the 
preferences of voters in a representative democratic system and these ought to be respected), the 
                                                 
3  See e.g. Schmidt, 2007 and  Schmidt, ed., 2007 for elaboration ; see also various contributions in Kostoris 
Padoa Schioppa, ed., 2005.  
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solution is to apply 'national treatment'. It means that EU Member States would allow "free" 
movement of goods (and services)  if the providers comply with the rules of the destination (host) 
country. Discrimination is forbidden in this approach. This approach would imply, at best, a very 
truncated instance of 'free movement'. Economically, it would lead to major trading costs incurred 
before having market access, due to costs of adaptation  ; indeed, the tariff equivalents of such costs  
may well imply a significant degree of factual protection from exposure to competitive imports from 
other EU countries. The EU internal market would largely remain fragmented except for goods (and 
services) which are not or only lightly regulated. Apart from non-discrimination in e.g. host country 
regulation, it differs little from (free) trade under the WTO. In other words, if one really wants 'deep' 
market integration, the national regulatory autonomy will have to be compromised to some degree.  
 
In traditional thinking, there are two ways of compromising national regulatory autonomy for the 
purpose of 'free movement' : prohibitions and 'harmonisation'. When prohibiting all regulatory or 
other non-tariff barriers in the EU, even when 'justified' by (say) market failures, welfare is bound to 
fall. The whole point of subjecting markets to regulation in the event of market failures is to prevent 
sub-optimal functioning of markets. The costs of  not overcoming market failures vary enormously, 
dependent on the issue and the kind of market failure, so it is hard to generalize.  
However, the very purpose 4 of the EU and a properly functioning  internal market as its principal 
means is to stimulate higher productivity increases and more economic growth, which is inconsistent 
with an approach of all-out prohibitions lowering welfare over a broad spectrum of applications. 
Indeed, an internal market with plenty of market failures is pointless.  
 
This leaves a third way:  harmonisation. The origin of the term reflects a sophisticated response to 
the fundamental problem of 'deep' market integration. The term used to refer to the idea that 
national regulation of the Member States would need to be 'brought into harmony' in such a way 
that 'free movement'  could be accomplished without all the costs of adaptation, etc. The English 
treaty term 'approximation'  similarly expresses this idea. However, in the early history of the EU,  
harmonisation degenerated into full uniformity due to mistrust (or bargaining tactics, under veto 
threat) of Member States and the initial refusal to accept the full consequences of 'deep ' market 
integration, including  some degree of regulatory adaptation. Harmonisation became excessively 
detailed  and 'heavy', causing high costs of (EU) regulation, and without any cost/ benefit analysis. 
Nowadays, there is a far greater awareness of the need to make 'proportionate' (EU) regulation, e.g. 
no more than necessary for the market failure.  
                                                 
4 Other than the broader political considerations of post-war peace and being a 'Community of values'.  
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Today, the European Commission is  held to subject every proposal to strict Regulatory Impact 
Assessment. 5  The lesson of  four decades of (EU) harmonisation is that one has to find a suitable 
balance between, on the one hand, not suppressing the preferences of the (or some) Member States 
too much (as this may be welfare decreasing), and, on the other hand, avoiding overly costly 
common regulation by incorporating each and every specific element of national (often diverse) 
rules, prompting 'regulatory failure'.  
 
The treaty incorporates all three options (see below section 2.2.). There is a general prohibition of 
what one might call regulatory barriers, but with derogations, as well as a broad harmonisation 
provision. National treatment might apply as well, once derogations of free movements can be 
invoked, and if these derogations are not disciplined in other ways by case-law. However, usually, 
one should expect  that derogations will prompt proposals for harmonisation of some kind. Certainly 
in goods, few areas are left over where derogations have remained without eventually having 
resulted in harmonisation (or at least attempts to do so). In other words, national treatment is no 
longer of much significance when speaking about free movement. But it ought to be noted that, in 
services, the mode of 'establishment'  is far more important than free movement (due to the need to 
satisfy clients' preferences of proximity of providers and of building relations of trust). In 
establishment, national treatment (host country rules) make more sense and normally cause 
fragmentation less easily. Thus, such national treatment is typically disciplined by general regulatory 
principles under the treaty ( including non-discrimination in a wide sense) and sometimes by basic 
common rules, leaving scope for local variation and discretion.  
 
After some 20 years of building the EU internal (goods) market, the balance between the three 
options and the results for free movement looked anything but promising. To put it simple, a huge 
number of regulatory barriers were still place because the general prohibition was undermined by 
countless derogations, invoked by member States almost without discipline, whilst harmonisation 
proved  costly and very slow (also due to vetoes). It is against this background that  MR as an 
innovation has to be understood. First, the CJEU interpretation of the prohibition was significantly 
tightened from a narrow legalistic to a more economic interpretation of what a (regulatory) barrier 
was. This meant that the burden of proof for Member States of what is a justified barrier, was made 
more difficult – it had simply been too easy before.  
                                                 
5 This is a subject of its own. For  Detailed Guidelines of the Commission, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/docs_en.htm For a very careful evaluation of the Commission 
impact assessments since 2003, see the report by the EU Court of Auditors, 2010, 
http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/5372733.pdf.  
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Second, the CJEU imposed a duty on Member States to 'think internal market', so to say, and not 
solely national. The criterium became 'equivalence'. Even if derogations were justified by overcoming 
market failures, this would not automatically mean that imports could be blocked. As it turned out, 
numerous instances appeared to exist where other Member States acted very similarly in response 
to the same market failures. If such national responses were 'equivalent' in terms of avoiding the 
market failure(s), neither harmonisation nor the refusal of market access would be justified. Free 
movement ought to be allowed, even if the details of national laws were distinct, as long as their 
objectives of e.g. protecting consumer or workers were "equivalent".  A fourth option had been born, 
Mutual Recognition, not undermining national regulatory autonomy, nor leading to harmonisation, 
yet 'deepening' market integration.  
 
 
2.2    Case-law on the fundamental trilemma and Mutual Recognition 
 
This section will discuss the same fundamental problem in the context of the treaty as well as CJEU 
case law, explaining in greater detail the logic of MR.    
 
As noted , the three options (before MR emerged) can be found in the treaty.  The second option – 
prohibition of 'other' barriers -  is laid down in art.s 34 and 36, TFEU. Art. 34 TFEU is not merely about 
forbidding quotas but also about "all measures having equivalent effect" (to quantitative 
restrictions).  If all 'other barriers' would fall under this term, an all-out prohibition would amount to 
a revolutionary amputation of national regulatory autonomy making it impossible to uphold the 
Member States' obligations (often in their constitutions) with respect to a number of risks such as 
safety and health aspects of goods. Such aspects can credibly relate to market failures. Therefore, in 
the light of the first option – respect for national regulatory autonomy, hence, national treatment - 
CJEU was initially very prudent in its case law on art. 34, TFEU, leaving ample scope for 'justified' 
exceptions for Member States. Moreover, and hardly surprising, Art. 36 TFEU comprises a series of 
derogations e.g. about health and intellectual property rights.6  As to the third option – 
harmonisation - Art. 114, TFEU (Art. 95, EC) forms the legal basis for 'approximation' for purposes of 
"… the establishment and functioning of the internal market". Figure 1 visualizes the 'trilemma' of 
the EU in effectively realizing and guaranteeing 'free movement of goods'.  
                                                 
6  Art. 34 TFEU  was Art. 28, EC  and Art. 30, EEC ; Art. 36, TFEU was Art. 30, EC and Art 36, EEC. These 
texts were never amended.  
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Figure 1:  EEC’s free-movement-of-goods trilemma 
 
 
Mutual recognition has emerged from the tensions, problems and profound dissatisfaction in 
combinating these three fundamental treaty provisions. Putting it simple, the Union was caught into 
a seemingly impossible trilemma: Art. 34 could not be relied on in a blanket form as this would erase 
the capacity of Member States to regulate, if only for correcting or overcoming market failures. Art. 
36 could not be relied on too much either since this would make a mockery of the common market 
idea, with more holes than a good Emmenthaler cheese; but Art. 114 was not a panacea either as it 
would imply building a vast EU regulatory regime over many decades, amounting to a drastic de-
facto centralisation, with all the costs that this would entail. Moreover, the decision-making (in the 
Council in the 1970s) ex Art. 114 was still under veto and the mistrust amongst Member States as 
well as vis-à-vis the Commission was such that EU rules were only acceptable to all if no discretion for 
escape or disguised protectionism would remain (the so-called Old Approach, going into extreme 
detail and with full technical specifications). So, when harmonisation was decided under unanimity, it 
was bound to generate excessive regulatory costs and – due to veto tactics and resistance to specific 
aspects which were left out for political reasons – relatively minor (net) benefits, while requiring 
disproportionate efforts by EU bodies, and fuelling considerable discord. Risking regulatory failure 
with net benefits so small ( or even negative) and going at snail's pace, this approach to 
harmonisation would never accomplish the internal goods market.  
Art 34, TFEU prohibition 
“all measures having equivalent 
effect” (to QRs) 
Art 36, TFEU derogations 
from Art 34 (above),  
plus derogations via case-law Art 
34 
Art 114, TFEU harmonization 
(in EU, always, when „necessary‟ for 
IM and only „proportionate‟) 
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In order to appreciate the CJEU case law from which mutual recognition emerged, one has to 
understand this trilemma but also remember the difference between the treaty concept of 'free 
movement'  and free trade. Had the Rome treaty relied on free trade, mutual recognition might 
never have been invented or at best in an intolerably crippled version.7   
Free movement is much more compelling than free trade8 as it forces the country into a different 
position: the right of market access (here: inside the EU) is not negotiable but guaranteed as such to 
economic agents, and the country can only deviate by explicit derogations as specified in the treaty 
or CJEU case law. 
Thus, free movement needs to be ensured by stringent prohibitions of the panoply of regulatory 
barriers. Otherwise, it would degenerate into free trade inside the EU customs union. In the early 
days, Art. 34, TFEU was legalistically interpreted : the term 'measures with an equivalent effect' did 
not catch anywhere near the number and types of 'regulatory barriers' required to render free 
movement economically meaningful in the internal goods market. Once the CJEU  understood that 
free movement requires an 'economic' interpretation of this prohibition (rather than a formal and 
too literal one), it ruled in Dassonville (case C-8/74) that such measures (i.e. what we call "regulatory 
barriers") refer to trading rules "capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, 
intra-Community trade". Such a formula is capable of covering practically all regulatory obstacles. 
This strict prohibition is balanced by derogations for Member States, which need to be respected at 
EU level. However, the Commission's 'guardian' role  and the CJEU case law also have the effect of 
disciplining the recourse to such derogations in terms of scope and interpretation, otherwise they 
would undermine the accomplishment of free movement. Mutual recognition is one critical principle 
disciplining the derogations of Member States, so that free movement (often) prevails.  
 
This discipline emerged with the Cassis-de-Dijon (C-120/78) case law, leading to mutual recognition 
(MR). See also Figure 2. Following logically from Dassonville, the CJEU first defines what is now called 
the "origin principle": "Member States must allow a product lawfully produced and marketed in 
another Member State into their own market..". Member States can block imports or condition them 
but only if "justified" (the derogations listed in art. 36, TFEU, and the case law, based on the rule-of-
reason, on art. 34, TFEU itself). As noted above, the issue is how to respect and discipline the 
recourse to these derogations. Case law since Cassis de Dijon does both (!) by asking whether a 
                                                 
7 An insightful elaboration of how far one might go under free trade is provided by Alan Sykes (1995). 
Under free trade, a country agrees not to impose tariffs and quotas and can bind itself under a treaty but 
remains autonomous otherwise. Such (mainly regulatory) autonomy can be further constrained in limited 
ways under the WTO. See e.g. Weiler, 2005 ; Sykes, 1995 ; Trachtman, 2007.   
8  Parts of the following and Figure 2 are adopted, with changes,  from Pelkmans, 2007a.  
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formally justified recourse to derogations really matters for the risks consumers or workers run in the 
internal market.9 The overwhelming majority of the exceptions invoked relate to what could be 
called "SHEC" type regulation, that is, related to objectives of Safety, Health, Environment or 
Consumer protection.10  SHEC regulation is in essence 'risk regulation'. If the risk reduction aimed for 
by SHEC objectives is similar between two or more Member States, the regulatory objective is 
essentially the same (equivalent), and a good can be freely imported without affecting regulatory 
preferences of the importing EU country. If equivalent, CJEU case law says that the derogation 
cannot be invoked. After all, the effect in terms of risks to consumers, workers, etc., is then similar so 
that the barrier cannot be justified. The importing Member State ought to 'recognize' that the 
regulatory regime of the exporting Member State does not increase risks in an appreciable way. In so 
doing, the CJEU implies that MR amounts to the combination of the origin principle and equivalence. 
This is  'judicial mutual recognition' (left bottom boxes in Figure 2). 
 
If not equivalent, the derogations do apply and the only way to restore free movement is 
'approximation'. However, even here MR can (and did) lead to a highly significant simplification. 
Thus, the New Approach is based on directives where the joint definition of regulatory (SHEC) 
objectives is what matters in the text.  Once objectives are commonly defined, the lack of 
equivalence is by definition removed and can no longer be a reason to hinder intra-EU imports. The 
Old Approach (mainly developed before Cassis de Dijon), by contrast, harmonizes by attempting to 
unify almost all technical aspects of (SHEC) regulation, including extremely detailed technical 
specifications, testing, approvals, inspection  and certification. This is unnecessarily costly and rigid. It 
is also exceedingly difficult to accomplish in Council decision-making and far more difficult still in a 
Council where Member States were insisting on veto power. The quality of this overly specific and 
detailed regulation suffered  for the simple reason that 'bad regulation' with superfluous or 
excessively costly requirements would be forced into EU law via the use of veto power. The Old 
Approach also violates any respect for diversity, even where it would have been possible.11 
                                                 
9 Note  that this test can be regarded as an early manifestation of a shift from form-based legalistic 
justifications to effects-based economic approaches, as is now customary in e.g. EU competition law. 
10  The notion of SHEC is a simplification but it catches the large bulk of regulatory issues related to MR. It 
is also relevant in services, be it that investor/ saver protection should be added as a special case (see 
section 7).  In Art. 36, TFEU the key references are to health and safety and possibly elements of 
environmental policy. The rule-of-reason case law ex. Art. 34, TFEU explicitly underpins environmental 
and consumer protection. All other justifications are either of trivial importance (e.g. arts trade)  or relate 
to IPRs. For legal analysis, see Barnard, 2007, chapters 6, 7 and 19  and Weiler, 2005. 
11 For details, see Atkins (1997). See Pelkmans (1987) for the many drawbacks of the Old Approach. 
Typical examples of this approach are the 23 tractor directives, the 1973 chocolate directive (meanwhile 
revised considerably), several other prescriptive food directives, the more than 50 car and car 
components directives enacted during the 1970s and 1980s (also revised since then), chemicals  and 
pharmaceuticals regulation.  
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Figure 2: Logic of Mutual Recognition goods 
 
LIBERALISATION, art. 34, TFEU 
(no regulatory barriers* to intra-EU imports) 
amplified by 'economic' 
interpretation in Dasson 
ville, 1974 ** 
Cassis de Dijon case law 
Origin principle: 
 MS must allow a product lawfully 
produced and marketed in another MS into 
their own market 
 unless a prohibition of this product is 
'justified' (cf. art 36,TFEU or 'mandatory' 
requirements, case law of art 34,TFEU) 
if justified, yet regulatory 
objectives are 'equivalent' 
judicial mutual recognition 
if justified, and regulatory 
objectives are NOT 
equivalent 
approximate rules via 
MR   origin principle, 
 and equivalence 
same objectives 
reference to 
standards / C. A. 
exhaustive 
details 
Old Approach 
New Approach 
(regulatory MR) 
thus: 
*  Art. 34, TFEU speaks of 'measures having an equivalent effect' to 'quantitative restrictions' . Since 
Dassonville, this is tantamount to regulatory barriers 
** What we call 'regulatory barriers,' are defined by the CJEU as "all trading rules enacted by MS which 
are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade." 
C.A. = Conformity Assessment     MS = Member States   Source : Pelkmans, 2007 a(as adapted) 
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The Old Approach can only be justified economically in cases of extreme risks where uncertainty is 
potentially too costly: the high costs of extreme specification are overcompensated by the benefits 
of avoiding unacceptable risks.  The New Approach is a lot easier to negotiate since it is 
predominantly about regulatory objectives. There is, in addition, a learning process among the 
Member States precisely because they cannot normally fall back on specific technical solutions, 
driven by engineers, but have to focus on risks, risk reduction and (much less restrictive) 
performance requirements.  
Thus, with the New Approach, the market failures are addressed whilst the costs of EU regulation fall 
considerably compared to the Old Approach.  The New Approach is therefore not synonymous with 
MR but the underlying thinking is closely related, which is why it can be referred to as 'regulatory 
mutual recognition'. This phrase refers to the common definition of regulatory objectives in a light 
directive.12 The absence of further technical details implies that different technical requirements are 
subject to MR. The sensitivity of this type of risk regulation is such that both Member States (e.g. 
inspectors where relevant) and business are in need of far greater practical guidance about what 
exactly is 'recognized' in markets; after all, one light directive might refer to many thousands of quite 
distinct goods. Indeed, in actual practice, when shipments arrive at a border or in harbours, civil 
servants or inspectors will typically focus on the detailed specifics in their national laws, presumably 
that is even their routine instruction or impulse. This problem turned out to be paramount for the 
practical working of judicial MR (see further), though barely realized at first. In regulatory MR it was 
addressed rightaway. Since the New Approach was regulatory in nature and an alternative to the Old 
Approach, all stakeholders immediately realized that the specifics – no longer incorporated in law as 
in the Old Approach –  had to be known for producers in other ways, before actual production would 
take place.  
Thus, in the New Approach, the common objectives in light directives are complemented by 
'reference to standards'. A carefully structured regime of 'co-regulation' has been set up which 
develops (voluntary) European technical standards on the basis of 'mandates' issued by the European 
Commission, in turn derived from the SHEC objectives in the relevant directive(s). Market 
participants, and not Eurocrats or national civil servants, develop standards for the EU. The 
Commission recognizes these standards (if a correct follow-up of the mandate, hence, serving SHEC 
objectives for the EU) and, after official publication, business can rely on them for intra-EU free 
                                                 
12  A  typical case is the toys directive 88/ 378/EEC, recently revised as dir. 2009/48/EC of 18 June 2009. 
An extremely broad application is the machines directive 98/37/EC covering more than 40 000 types of 
machines.  
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movement.13 This regime is much appreciated because it provides business with guidelines and 
certainty. European standards incorporated in a regulatory MR regime are also attractive because 
they do remain voluntary. In case a company is innovative and creates novel aspects or techniques or 
uses new materials not foreseen in a European standard, the new good can be tested directly (and 
certified) on the compliance with the SHEC objectives in the relevant directive(s).   
 
Unlike the Old Approach, innovation is not throttled for two reasons: (i) performance standards are 
expected and they provide a lot of room for product differentiation and innovation14  and (ii) a 
company is, even with the flexible performance standard, still free to construct 'around' the standard 
(though it needs to acquire certification from a so-called Notified Body, assigned to fulfil these tasks).  
In short, as Figure 2 sets out, 'judicial mutual recognition' amounts to the origin principle in its pure 
formulation, together with equivalence of existing regulatory objectives of Member States, whereas 
its main alternative, 'regulatory MR', consists of the common regulation of SHEC objectives, together 
with mutual recognition of all the specific technical requirements in national laws facilitated by 
recognized European performance standards. In both approaches, the quite sensational result is that 
existing technical details in national laws, supposedly to be enforced by the responsible inspectors or 
civil servants, cannot be used to block intra-EU imports, except if that good does not comply with 
recognized European standards or clearly violates SHEC objectives themselves.  
 
2.3    A digression on how MR case law works  
In stylizing the MR case law with Figure 2, the logic of focussing on equivalent objectives stands out. 
The objectives reflect the market failures to be overcome, providing justified reasons to regulate in 
the first place. In an economic perspective, this is what matters. However, European lawyers would 
probably find such a presentation of the CJEU case law wanting. Although there can be no doubt that 
the CJEU has emphasized time and again that Member States ought to think and act in terms of 
equivalence in a number of ways, there are also numerous CJEU cases about restrictions of the free 
movement of goods where equivalence considerations are absent. Does  that imply that MR is not 
relevant i.e. Figure 2 would not apply? The answer is that restrictions may be declared illegal under 
EU law for many other reasons, which, in standard case law proceedings, tend to be verified before 
                                                 
13 This is legally referred to as the "presumption of compliance". For European business, this is cost saving 
in terms of information and incentivising in terms of legal certainty. Companies, when making technical 
products, will have few difficulties in following European performance standards in their in-factory 
manuals. If done faithfully, the goods will then enjoy intra-EU market access, without the need to master 
complex EU case law. 
14 Indeed, the use of (prescriptive, hence, restrictive) design standards has to be justified. The result is that 
they have become exceedingly rare nowadays. 
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arriving at an equivalence test. See Figure 3. If  a Member State claims that its restrictions of free 
movement are 'justified'  (see the upper left box) by derogations, routine case law will first test these 
derogations against a number of core principles and conditions of EU law, arising from the treaty or 
case law itself (see central box). The most prominent one is non-discrimination on grounds of 
nationality (Art. 18, TFEU) on the basis of which  the CJEU has developed  strict and extensive case 
law ever since the outset of the EU. Member States have learnt, by now, to avoid discrimination in 
goods markets but this has taken decades and remains less than perfect. If a restriction is caught as 
discriminatory, it is illegal and no equivalence test is needed.  
 
The second condition is spelled out in modern regulatory parlance: proper risk assessment (i.e. 
science based by independent experts and in tune with internationally expected rigour in analysis). 
The idea is that, since SHEC is risk regulation,  the risk(s)  have to be underpinned by state-of-the-art 
scientific analysis, as the basis for risk-reducing national regulation, in order to be evaluated by the 
CJEU. In cases of 'disguised' protectionism, this test is an effective way to reveal that restrictions of 
free movement based on national regulation do not offer consumers or workers any (greater) 
protection in terms of SHEC. Initially, systematic risk assessment was not practiced in Europe (except 
in e.g. pharmaceuticals) and ad-hoc testimonies by scientists in court would accomplish analogue 
results. 15   
 
Third, the 'necessity' test aims to verify that regulatory interventions by the EU country are 
'necessary' given the risk reduction preferences. The CJEU tends to assume a strict position. It might 
also verify whether the measures are actually suitable to bring down the risks to the desired level. 
Finally, and decisive in numerous cases, the CJEU applies a "proportionality" test in an ever stricter 
fashion over time. Narrowly conceived, proportionality is equated with "no more than necessary" on 
order to achieve the regulatory objective. In many cases the CJEU could avoid having to render a 
judgment on national objectives (expressing national preferences) by focussing solely on the relation 
between instruments and objective(s). In particular, the restrictive effect on free movement (hence, 
the costs inflicted on actual or potential competitors from other Member States) can often be 
avoided or reduced by other regulatory options. More widely conceived, the CJEU has insisted that 
Member States take into account the internal market context of their measures, that is, imposing a 
duty on (a) Member State(s) to cooperate in pre-empting regulatory barriers. 
                                                 
15  Example : in the nisine case  (Koninklijke Kaasfabriek Eyssen, Case 53/80 [ 1981 ] E.C.R. 409) the 
Netherlands was allowed to keep its restrictive approach to nisine as an additive to cheese, only after 
scientific testimonies on the possible hazards and risks turned out to be split, and the country got the 
benefit of the doubt.  
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Figure  3: Mutual Recognition CJEU analysis in goods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is a critical step towards MR. Altogether, these four tests (in the central box of Figure 3) can be 
said to amount to "good regulation principles in an internal market context". Adhering to those 
principles already reduces the restrictions to free movement of goods a great deal. In other words, 
besides the national economic benefits of  'good regulation', the static and dynamic benefits of 
actual and potential cross-border competition in the internal goods market can be enjoyed as well.  
 
Following these tests one can shift to the third box in Figure 3: the question of 'equivalence'. In 
principle, this is about equivalence of objectives but, in actual practice, it usually takes the form of 
practical verification of instruments reflecting these objectives.  
 Origin pr. 
 Unless derogations 
o Justified (art. 36, TFEU) 
o Mandatory req.ts 
(case-law, art. 34 TFEU) 
Derogations subject to  
„good regulation‟ tests in IM: 
 non-discrimination 
 (proper) risk-assessment 
 necessity (strict) 
 proportionality (strict) 
Are SHEC objectives in A and B 
“equivalent”? 
[NOTE, often by verifying standards, 
testing or approval (etc.) in origin country] 
If yes, MR  derogations inapplicable 
Cassis  
de-Dijon 
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Thus, the CJEU has a long track record in prohibiting identical testing in the destination country 
compared to proven tests in the origin country. Similarly, verifications can refer to (European or 
equivalent national) standards, (type) approvals, certification or inspection reports. In this 
operational approach, this test comes very close to the duty, sometimes imposed as a result of the 
proportionality test, of Member States to work together in a spirit of avoiding barriers when 
equivalence renders them superfluous.  
 
3.    Preventing new regulatory barriers from arising 
MR, whether judicial or regulatory, pays attention to the stock of regulatory barriers in the internal 
goods market. But focussing on the stock is rather narrow-minded. Perhaps it is too little realized but 
Member States have grown into genuine 'regulatory machines'.  The painstaking case law based on 
MR and the enormous European standardisation work linked to the New Approach -  no matter how 
helpful -  completely ignore that Member States tend to create a steady flow of new regulatory 
barriers year after year. In the days of unanimity, given a very low speed of harmonisation removing 
barriers, the Commission began to fear that the fragmentation of the internal goods market was 
increasing, not decreasing. Even before the EU would succeed in its rethink of the method of 
harmonisation (the New Approach), a mechanism was set up to ensure that the flow of new national 
regulation would be subjected by a kind of MR, and, in so doing, not add new restrictions of free 
movement.  It is possible to show convincingly that the internal goods market would long have been 
hopelessly constricted, if the EU would not have introduced an amazingly tough control and 
correction system for new national legislation in process.16   
This system is based on ideas underlying MR, topped up by an intrusive and stringent notification 
system (with tough sanctions in case of non-notification, emerging from firm rulings by the CJEU), 
close monitoring by the Commission of failures to notify, detailed scrutiny of draft laws of Member 
States by a special Committee chaired by the Commission, and – most remarkable of all – automatic 
or semi-automatic suspension of the national legislative process for periods varying from 3 months to 
as much as 18 months, dependent on the need for remedies and their nature. This contribution is 
not the place to discuss all the features of the regime 17 but it is difficult to overestimate its merits. 
 
                                                 
16  The Mutual Information directive 98/34 (before 83/ 189/EEC), recently amended as dir. 2006/96/EC, 
OJEU 2006, L 363, p. 81.  The Committee is still called the 98/34 Ctee.  
17 See Pelkmans, Vos & di Mauro, 2000, for an extensive explanation and discussion of this control 
mechanism.  
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What matters for present purposes is how central MR is to the remedies sought. The basic 
requirement for these (new) national regulations is that there be explicit and clear clauses on MR or 
'equivalence'. After all, regulations where Member States still have regulatory autonomy (in goods) 
must be in the 'non-harmonized area' 18 and that is where MR ought to apply. Such clauses can be 
attached to the objectives or the technical standards referred to. Reference to standards becomes 
more effective over time as CEN and CENELEC 19 increasingly write standards which, by definition, are 
valid for all EEA countries, Turkey (due to the customs union with the EU), Switzerland (due to 
bilateral agreements) and several other European countries. In a rising number of instances, such 
standards may be identical with world standards.20  When world standards are used in such 
instances,  MR extends to imports from third countries if adherence to these standards is ensured by 
credible conformity assessment. The large majority of national draft laws passing the 98/34 
committee either contains equivalence clauses by now or are adjusted after insistence by the 
committee (Pelkmans, Vos & di Mauro, 2000). If the enacted laws, later, do not have such clauses, 
they infringe EU law, and are unenforceable against intra-EU imports. The conclusion is that the 
regime, backed up by significant resources and efforts as well as by strict CJEU rulings, forms a 
powerful and credible agent for mutual recognition to be maintained and to become more 'visible' 
for business over time.  
 
The numbers are impressive. Between 1988 and 1998 the total number of national notifications was 
about 5000 and the trend was upward (Pelkmans, Vos & di Mauro., 2000, p. 274). In the period 1999 
to 2005, the annual rate was close to 600 a year and moved up once the new Member States came in 
(Pelkmans, 2007a, p. 707). The 'comments' and so-called 'detailed opinions' from other Member 
States and the Commission during those seven years suggest that some 2100 national draft laws 
were suspected to cause barriers in future. These staggering quantities of national regulations and 
decrees, if gone unchecked, would have made a mockery of the internal goods market. 21   
                                                 
18 If an issue is subject to harmonized EU regulation, Member States lose their regulatory autonomy.  
19 These two and ETSI (telecoms and internet standards) are the three European standardisation bodies, 
linked to the New Approach and other EU regulatory initiatives via Memoranda of Understanding.  
20  CEN, CENELEC and ETSI have agreements (e.g. the Dresden and Vienna ones) with ISO and IEC as well 
as the ITU which facilitate the fullest possible use of world standards when writing European standards. 
In reality, it is often the other way around : European standards are quite often used as (a basis for) world 
standards. The EU is far more active than e.g. ANSI, the American Standards body in ISO, in world 
standardisation. For example, according to  Renda & Schrefler, 2006, 27 % of CEN standards reflect ISO 
standards and 57 % of CENELEC standards is identical to IEC standards. See also WTO, 2005.  
21 That Member States are regulatory machines is realized even better if one knows that these new 
regulations relate to only one-third of all goods traded in the EU. Some 50 %  fall under harmonized rules 
(hence, Member States can no longer enact alone in these areas) and some 20 % are unregulated goods 
markets.  
Jacques Pelkmans - Mutual Recognition: economic and regulatory logic in goods and services 
 
17 
 
The newest report22 shows an average of 663 notifications for the years 2006 through 2008 (so, 
almost 2000 such draft laws for about one-third of the goods traded in the EU!). Commission and 
Member States reacted 1215 times to these notifications, with 'detailed opinions' (where the 
suspicion of emerging barriers is strong) totalling no less than 321!  What would have become of the 
single goods market without MR, as the basis for this procedure?  
 
4.   Benefits and costs of EU mutual recognition until 2008 
It is insightful to subject MR in goods to a benefit/cost analysis. This is done in Table 1 and briefly 
elaborated in the text of the present section.23 There are many benefits to MR, whether judicial or 
regulatory. Table 1 suggests three categories of benefits. First, regulatory benefits, in the sense of 
'better regulation'. If MR is purely judicial, Member States' autonomy with respect to regulatory 
objectives is retained due to their 'equivalence', even though free movement prevails. If MR is 
regulatory, Art. 114/3 TFEU prescribes a high level of protection (typically, in SHEC-type risk 
regulation), so that there can be no race to the bottom via bargaining. Moreover, there will be a bias 
against regulatory failure of Member States because technical specifications (which might lead to 
overregulation) are no longer in directives, whilst the technical standards referred to are based on 
performance criteria rather than design (i.e. prescriptive detail). 
Second, strategic benefits relate to the deepening and quality of the internal market. If MR is 
judiciary, the breakthrough was and is that free movement prevails whereas it was hindered or 
blocked before. It accomplishes this without adding any EU regulation, that is, it avoids 
centralisation. Moreover, judicial MR disciplines Member States' overregulation, since their rules 
cannot stop intra-EU imports originating from regimes with lighter rules (as long as the objectives are 
equivalent). Finally, judicial MR forms the basis for 'regulatory competition' without a race to the 
bottom which goes further than MR in a static sense.24 If MR is regulatory, the deepening of the 
                                                 
22  See COM (2009)690 of 21 December 2009, The operation of directive 98/34 from 2006 to 2008, and 
COM Staff Document SEC (2009) 1704 on the same date.  
23 This section, including Table 1, is adapted from Pelkmans, 2007a, with relatively minor changes. 
24 See Sun & Pelkmans, 1995, for an elaborate assessment of the conditions for regulatory competition in 
the EU internal market for goods to occur, and improve welfare, with  a case study in goods and one in 
services. It is crucial to first realize that regulatory competition in the internal market can only work if 
equivalence of objectives is ensured, that is, if MR applies. If not, Member States will tend to invoke the 
derogations  and intra-EU trade will be impeded. However, this invocation is only legal if based on a 
market failure, usually a problem of  SHEC, in turn based on a credible risk assessment with scientific 
evidence. Thus, miniscule residues of catalizers for large-scale beer brewing as well as preservatives 
(when beer travels long distances) violate the German beer purity law, but have no consequences for 
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internal market is accelerated because lengthy negotiations can be avoided (especially blockages on 
technical details) and agreement on goals is far easier. This is so because ministers in Council or MEPs 
are not hindered by a lack of technical expertise or deep asymmetries of information when it comes 
to setting regulatory objectives, instead of an ocean of technical detail. After 1985, when Council 
began to apply qualified majority voting, agreement became relatively easy to accomplish. 
Furthermore, regulatory MR disciplines overregulation at both levels of government, since the focus 
is on objectives and the reliance on European performance standards reduces considerably the scope 
for idiosyncratic (or, protectionist?) specifics. Regulatory MR does add EU rules but minimally so, and 
drastically less than the Old Approach would do.   
The third benefit concerns economic welfare which is what the internal market is all about: MR is 
pro-competitive, if not strongly pro-competitive at times compared to its alternatives, be it that 
strategic quality games cannot be excluded (given that equivalence of objectives is to be satisfied). 
Box 1 elaborates on the scarce economic analysis available in the literature. With this litany of 
advantages, MR seems almost too-good-to-be-true. Indeed, this is how, naively, MR is often 
portrayed among economists. Unfortunately, there is an inclination to neglect the considerable 
drawbacks of MR in actual practice, both for business and authorities, whether EU or national. It is 
important to appreciate the costs of MR for business and authorities. 
 
Table 1 distinguishes three types of costs. First, information costs, which are especially large for 
judicial MR. After all, MR is 'invisible' to economic agents, unless specific laws contain clear 
equivalence clauses, be it on objectives or standards. What economic agents 'see' are the 
requirements in local laws. Since judicial MR is developed in CJEU case law, numerous businesses 
have no idea about MR or that it might matter to them, let alone that companies would know how to 
verify whether it is applied to their goods.  One costly consequence of this ignorance is that many 
SMEs fail to consider MR and thus either refrain from exporting to countries, or, do export but after 
costly adaptations, which is exactly what MR aims to avoid. For companies which do know about MR, 
the costs of verifying whether MR would apply to their goods can be high and/or lead to uncertainty.  
                                                                                                                                                        
health or safety. Thus, whilst Germany can maintain its beer purity law for domestic producers, that law 
cannot be a reason to stop the import of beer from other Member States. It does not follow, however, that 
beer brewers located in Germany are immediately and powerfully exposed to price competitive imports of  
'other' EU beer. Beer distribution in German pubs is entirely in the hands of local breweries  and, more 
often than not, Germans stick to beer made according to the purity law.  What one observes is some 
marginal penetration in supermarkets (bottles/cans) and patrol stations along highways  and its pro-
competitive impact is probably modest. Therefore, regulatory competition should be subjected to a careful 
industrial economic analysis before jumping to conclusions about the removal of local (over?) regulation 
prompted by local industry 'suffering' from local rules stricter than rules in other Member States. 
Stronger, the larger German breweries do not  have to apply the purity law to exports (which for  some of 
them is their lifeline of business)  and therefore remain competitive in the internal market.  
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Table 1: Benefits and Costs of mutual recognition 
 
types of 
BENEFITS 
judicial MR regulatory MR types of  
COSTS 
judicial MR regulatory 
MR 
regulatory autonomy MS 
retained for 
objectives 
common SHEC 
objectives 
ensured 
 
bias against 
'regulatory 
failure' 
information MR 'invisible' for 
economic agents, 
except at high 
costs (w/o clear 
MR clauses) 
 
even if info is 
collected, many 
'grey areas'; 
uncertainty (e.g. 
case law) for 
business and 
MSAU 
 
no rule book 
imposed on 
MSAU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
some modest 
uncertainty, if 
European 
standards are 
lacking or 
innovation is 
used 
strategic free 
movement 
prevails 
 
 
over-
regulation of 
MS disciplined 
 
basis for 
regulatory 
competition 
w/o race to 
the bottom 
 
 
no (add'l.) EU 
rules 
internal market 
deepening 
accelerated 
 
over-regulation 
MS & EU 
disciplined 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
only minimal 
(extra) EU rules 
transaction monitoring 
extremely costly, 
evidence 
anecdotal at best 
 
When MSAU 
refuse, reputation 
and waiting costs, 
little (EU) help 
(except SOLVIT) 
 
assuring rights for 
business 
unattractive, 
costly and slow 
regulatory & 
standardizers' 
networks 
monitor and 
solve, partly 
(with delays) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
economic 
welfare 
pro-
competitive 
pro-competitive compliance unknown, 
possibly serious 
costs for existing 
rules 
 
Notes: MS = Member States; MSAU = MS Authorities 
N.B. This table merely assesses MR of existing rules (that is, section 2 and not section 3 of this paper) 
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BOX 1:  Mutual recognition and economic welfare 
Despite the appreciation for mutual recognition that economists often show, there is scant 
economic analysis in the literature. A number of case studies for the Cecchini report (esp. MAC 
Group, 1988) and as well as for the Monti ex-post-1992 report (esp. Atkins, 1997) comprise fairly 
careful cost estimates of the failure to apply mutual recognition. Anecdotal and qualitative evidence 
about similar instances can also be had from UNICE  (2004) and EFTA (2008).  
There are scattered attempts to develop economic theory but it is disjointed and no 'body' of 
economic analysis is available yet. One 'strand' which has received some attention is based on the 
cost-increasing effect of regulatory barriers rendering market entry more difficult. Abraham (1991) 
shows graphically and for homogeneous goods that, dependent on the costs of adjustment to enter 
national markets inside the internal goods market, that the latter may well remain effectively 
fragmented, with permanent price disparities. The Old Approach, with vetoes, is likely to prompt 
calls for a level-playing field, which is bound to push up the overall EU level of regulation and 
thereby "raising rivals' costs", in turn significantly reducing the competitive threat for the least 
competitive country. Mutual recognition would thus be clearly pro-competitive. Falvey (1989) and 
Abraham (1991) consider SHEC regulations as 'quality signalling'. With mutual recognition, 
consumers in the high price country have an information problem : they might distrust the low price 
as a signal of lower quality. This is likely to induce the low-price exporters to invest in reputation 
building (e.g. voluntary certification)  or to announce to systematically test & certify their goods on 
compliance with standards from the high cost country. Perhaps unexpectedly, this leads to what 
David Vogel (1995) has observed and called "trading up", a convergence to higher quality levels 
between trading countries. Theoretically more sophisticated but even further removed from the 
practice of MR in the EU, is Lutz' (1996) model of vertical product differentiation. He shows, under 
restrictive assumptions, that mutual recognition can generate a higher economic welfare than both 
no regulation and full harmonisation. But the case is not a general one e.g. his model can even 
produce the result that entry deterrence can be achieved by strategically choosing quality. Yet 
another study by Suwa-Eisenmann & Verdier (2002) introduces a political support function (only 
having regard to the producer interest). With distinct institutional capacities, implicit regulatory 
protection inside the Union can emerge. Finally, Felbermayr & Jung (2008) introduce technical 
barriers and mutual recognition in the new trade models with heterogeneous firms. The authors are 
interested in unravelling the effects of e.g. mutual recognition on industry productivity but strictly 
within the rigour of this new family of models. One result, based on a calibrated version of their 
model, is that lower technical barriers (so not necessarily mutual recognition only) lead to 
reallocation of market shares from more to less productive firms. 
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In addition, there are costs because of 'grey areas' about when 'equivalence' applies, both for 
business and the authorities, even when national authorities do act in a spirit of MR. Unfortunately, 
the lack of a 'rule book' for MR, in particular for national inspecting agencies or other officials, causes 
most civil servants not to act in that spirit; rather, they often attempt to enforce local rules. The 
Commission has gradually come to realize the downside of judicial MR and issued reports and soft 
guidelines, it has also greatly improved the information on its (TRIS) website25,  promoted seminars 
and launched a special campaign for the new Member States. Vis a vis business this is unlikely to help 
much because many SMEs tend to ignore such general campaigns. For officials the utility is greater. 
For regulatory MR, information costs are far lower.  
 
Second, transaction costs are also substantial for judicial MR. However, hard evidence about 
transaction costs is scattered and/or anecdotal, with little idea of how representative these data are, 
as the Commission cannot monitor judicial MR. Case studies indicate that in particular SMEs are 
deterred by actual transaction costs as well as by uncertainty. The deterrent effect is greatest when 
Member States' authorities routinely refuse market access if a good does not match local technical 
requirements. Imposing withdrawal implies a loss of reputation for the company at stake. This is 
followed by waiting costs, which can only be reduced drastically if bilateral cooperation between 
Member States is quasi-automatic or the Commission intervenes. Waiting costs can be sensitive if 
time-to-market matters a lot in sales and marketing. The recent SOLVIT voluntary cooperation 
procedures 26 are beginning to help fill this gap.  
 
Furthermore, business is often hesitant to ensure their rights under Community law. One reason is 
that future business in the destination country ought not to be jeopardized. Besides, the pursuit of 
one's rights under Community law is very slow and costly. Business often rightly notes that legal 
progress about free movement should not be conquered by them but reasonably guaranteed by the 
system.27 It is striking that these costs are arising, in part,  from the absence of networking between 
                                                 
25 The TRIS website provides information on the removal or prevention of regulatory (mainly technical) 
barriers to free movement. See http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/tris/index_en.htm 
26 SOLVIT is an on-line problem-solving network of national officials, coordinated by the Commission. It 
tackles complaints about the misapplication of internal market (and other EU) law by public authorities 
but without legal proceedings, in a period of no more than ten weeks. In September 2006, SOLVIT claimed 
a success rate of 75 % of cases solved 'informally', a clear incentive to use it, although some Member 
States leave their SOLVIT units understaffed, thereby frustrating the process. Some 16 % of the cases are 
about market access of goods. See http://ec.europa.eu/solvit/site/index_en.htm .  
27  The frustrations about the practical problems or indeed neglect of MR were so strong that European 
business began to turn away from MR. A first manifestation of this turn-around can be found in the 
Monitor report (1995) and the UNICE (1995) regulation report. With a delay the Commission started to 
recognize these issues, once it moved away from a narrow case-law based mindset about MR. See 
COM(1999)299 of 16 June 1999, on MR in the internal market and COM(2002)419 of 23 July 2002, the 
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Member States and sound investment in bilateral cooperation inside the Union. The contrast with 
regulatory MR is significant. In sectors covered by the New Approach, regulatory and standardizers' 
networks broadly monitor, contacts are not anonymous, occasional network meetings take place and 
some problem solving does occur, be it with delays. As a result, assuring one's rights is rarely 
necessary.  
Third, compliance costs typically exist when judicial MR fails; under regulatory MR they are 
exceptional. However, there is no reliable evidence on compliance costs. 
 
Until 2008, MR in the EU goods market was therefore characterized by multiple and substantial 
benefits and a number of costs which, for business, tended to accumulate to often deterrent levels. 
There are also costs for national authorities when they enforce rules in the spirit of MR. The 
disturbing conclusion, at least for judicial MR, is that the very companies relying on MR in the 
internal market are hardly 'protected' by its regime. The incentives were in some ways perverse and 
they will have to be altered into positive ones for judicial MR to engender the much wanted benefits 
for the Union. The picture for regulatory MR is far brighter. 
 
5.   Restoring mutual recognition incentives under proper EU governance 
For about a decade, the Commission and stakeholders28 have cooperated in relative tranquility in 
order to introduce appropriate 'governance' systems ensuring that MR would work much better in 
the single market. The outcome29 consists of three pieces of EU legislation : one on the application of 
MR by Member States and the obligations of companies (Regulation 764/2008), and two on 
overcoming the imperfections of the New Approach (Regulation 765/2008  and Decision 768/2008).30  
                                                                                                                                                        
second bi-annual report on MR. Examples were published in the Internal Market Scoreboard no. 10 of May 
2002. How deep business frustration ran, however, is clear from UNICE, 2004, under the telling title : "It's 
the internal market, stupid!", with many examples of neglect or misapplication of MR. Indeed, it appears 
from interviews of businesses having relied on MR that "firms find themselves unwillingly appointed as 
guardian of the Treaty (here, free movement under MR), chasing violations at their own costs" (Pelkmans, 
2005, p. 123).  
28 Including European business, standardisation bodies, testing and certification bodies (including 
Notified Bodies, assigned by the EU to execute conformity assessment under the New Approach), 
accreditation networks in Europe, consumers, the EU Economic and Social Committee as well as Council 
working groups and the IMCO committee of the European Parliament. 
29 The so-called 2008 Goods Package, also referred to as the New Legislative Framework.  
30  Reg. 764/2008 ( the Mutual Recognition regulation) of 9 July 2008 laying down procedures relating to 
the application of certain national technical rules to products lawfully marketed in another Member State 
and repealing Decision 3052/95/EC, in OJEU of 13 August 2008, L 218, pp. 21 – 29 ; Reg. 765/2008 (the 
accreditation & surveillance regulation) of 9 July 2008 setting out the requirements for accreditation and 
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After a brief note on the latter two pieces of EU legislation, the focus will be on  MR regulation 764/ 
2008. The accreditation & market surveillance regulation 765/2008 addresses four concerns of the 
New Approach: accreditation, market surveillance, import controls and CE marking. None of these 
affect the fundamental link between the New Approach and MR (the agreement on common 
objectives, hence equivalence) but two of them are relevant for secondary instances of MR in the 
New Approach. The first one is concerned with the MR of certificates issued by Notified Bodies (EU 
approved certification bodies) which is extremely convenient for European business.  It turned out 
that not all Notified Bodies had been subjected to strict eligibility criteria by 'their' Member States 
and this has led to various problems and a lack of credibility. With a new, permanent, high- quality 
European system of accreditation as well as peer review, the consistent and high degree of credibility 
of Notified Bodies will be ensured. With respect to CE marking, consumers and their associations 
have often complained about confusion with other marks, the evasion of the manufacturers' 
responsibility (in the value chain) and unreliable self-certification (hence, sticking a CE mark) in the 
case of certain imports. Regulation 765/2008 tackles these problems and tightens import controls.31 
 
The Mutual Recognition regulation 764/2008 constitutes a response to the numerous complaints and 
criticisms about the factual working of MR on the 'ground' (see section 4). The purpose of the 
regulation is to significantly reduce the various costs of MR to European business and, in so doing, 
enhance the internal market benefits. It does this via two routes : (a) information obligations (e.g. on 
technical requirements in rules for the relevant goods) are imposed on EU countries in order to help 
EU-based companies intending to access the local market  as well as administrations of other 
Member States; (b) a detailed specification of how a correct application of MR brings with it 
extensive procedural safeguards, such that the burden of proof of not granting MR is essentially on 
the importing Member State. The first track lowers or eliminates the information costs so that 
companies merely incur the ordinary business risks when accessing a national market in the EU: good 
for them and good for (actual or potential) competition in the single market as a whole. The second 
track  respects the national regulatory autonomy and the public interest pursued via regulation (as 
the MR case law does as well), but imposes disciplines on the Member States in shifting the burden 
of proof for not respecting MR, even when goods have already been marketed elsewhere in the 
internal market, onto those authorities.  The required proof is subjected to EU rules which protects 
the companies against arbitrary or too hastily decided barriers.  
                                                                                                                                                        
market surveillance relating to the marketing of products and repealing Reg. (EEC) 339/93 in OJEU of 13 
August 2008, L 218, pp. 30 – 47 ; Decision 768/2008/EC of 9 July 2008 on a common framework for the 
marketing of products, and repealing Council Decision 93/465/EEC in OJEU of 13 August 2008, L 218, pp. 
82 – 128.  
31  For details, see Pelkmans, 2009. 
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Moreover, the rules impose transparancy and facilitate appeal. For all these reasons, the regulation 
is a genuine relief for business, in particular SMEs.  Figure 4 summarizes the key provisions.  
 
Figure 4: Mutual  recognition regulation 764/2008 
 
Procedural safeguards for Mutual Recognition   via  
 Information oblgations to companies from other Member States (entrants) 
 Proper application mutual recognition 
  
 General : 
 deals with ‘technical rules’ not harmonized  
at EU level 
 specific exceptions and ‘general prohibitions’ 
(public morality or security, e.g. weapons) 
 
Mutual recognition and reversal  of the 
burden of proof  
 purpose : Member States have the 
burden of proof for non-conformity in 
case the product has already been 
lawfully marketed elsewhere in de EU  
 Art. 4, economic operator provides 
information  (on request of the EU 
country of destination) about the 
properties of the  product and the lawful 
marketing (earlier, elsewhere in the EU)  
 Mutual recognition of the certification 
by accredited bodies (viz.  Reg.. 
765/2008) 
 (Art. 6) various procedural safeguards 
for a company about to access the 
market of  Member State X, in the event 
X wants to prohibit the product (written, 
technical or scientific evidence, on the 
basis of the 'essential requirements' 
[CJEU language for regulatory 
objectives], etc..) 
 plus a period of 20 days, no temporary 
suspension during procedures (except 
for 'serious risk" ); failing a response  
within 20 days, access granted 
automatically 
 appeal possible 
  Information obligations (Member St. & COM) 
 purpose is to reduce information costs  
drastically and, in so doing, facilitate the 
exploitation of free movement and MR 
 accessibility of national technical rules (esp.  
for SMEs) 
 system of ‘contactpoints’ (see item 29, pre-
amble); info free, within 15 days, sufficient 
means, explicit reference to SOLVIT 
 Commission draws up indicative, non-
exhaustive list of products falling under the 
‘non-harmonised sector’ 
 
plus: electronic system for exchange of 
technical  information between  
contactpoints of the  Member States [ 
encouragement, not compulsory] 
                                
 
 
 
 
N.B.  In force as from. 13 May 2009  
  
 
Jacques Pelkmans - Mutual Recognition: economic and regulatory logic in goods and services 
 
25 
 
The information obligations for Member States have to be organized structurally via so-called 
"contact points", behind which a system has to be set up making it possible to access and provide 
highly specialized technical information (what laws and decrees? what (national or European ) 
standards ; what institutions involved ?).  Such information has to be given for free (as a right) and 
within two weeks. The back-up system has to dispose of sufficient means in order to be capable of 
delivery throughout the year. The 27 contact points are expected to be in touch with one another 
routinely (a new electronic system might be set up for that purpose) so as to make MR work much 
better and without much ado.  This should be an effective underpinning of mutual trust, 
indispensable for smooth MR. A further 'service' to European business is the Commission 
announcement of a list of goods falling under MR, in eurospeak the "non-harmonized sector".  
Meanwhile, a first version of such a list has become available but it is not improbable that improved 
and refined lists will follow in the future since the identification of exactly what does and does not 
fall under MR is not always easy.32  
 
The reversal of the burden of proof is new but can, in fact, be traced back to an Interpretative Note 
of the case law on MR in 2003.33  The procedures are prescribed in considerable detail and avoid that 
a company is left in limbo : suspension of the import is not allowed unless there is a 'serious risk'  and 
long delays (beyond a total of 40 days) will result in automatic market access.  One does not need to 
read more than the UNICE reports (op. cit. ), the two Commission communications on MR of 1999 
and 2002 (op. cit.) as well as the Interpretative Note to appreciate what a great difference the 
reversal implies for European business : apart from the psychological effect, Member States will be 
forced to alter their administrative conduct at all levels and firms will be able to enforce their rights 
under much greater legal certainty and with lower costs, if any.34   
 
It is important to underline that nothing in these procedures affects the SHEC objectives of national 
regulations. If there is a genuine issue of non-conformity, the Member State has every right to take 
the good from the market and the Commission will normally support that.  
                                                 
32  This only goes to show that, in some cases,  European business was, and to some extent still is at times, 
uncertain about the relevance of MR to their products. The list can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/intsub/a12/ . 
33  Interpretative Communication on easier access for goods, practical application of the MR principle, in 
OJEC  C 265 of  4 November 2003, in which also many instances of improper conduct by national 
authorities are discussed, showing the necessity of the reversal for business.  The reader should also 
realize that the CJEU is wary of employing the term "mutual recognition", even though it is the very source 
of the idea. However, in the Pre-able of Reg. 764/2008, the term MR is employed without reservation. 
34  More examples of problems caused by Member States are found in Atkins, 1997  and in Pelkmans, 
2005.  
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Finally, a subtle difference between Reg. 764/2008 and the previous rules consists in the MR of 
certificates. From now on, this general term covers voluntary certification as well (that is, outside the 
New Approach and therefore possibly of relevance to [unharmonized] national regulation). For 
business, this is an efficiency improvement since companies often insist on testing other properties 
than the EU SHEC requirements (for example, durability or consistent quality, especially for 
components). More often than not, Member States refused to recognize such voluntary certification 
done elsewhere where it mattered for their national requirements.  
It would seem that the MR regulation has rightly been applauded as the appropriate 'governance' to 
make MR work as intended and thereby deepening the internal market for goods, whilst improving 
its effective functioning.  
 
6.    Mutual recognition in services : horizontal  liberalisation  
Negative and positive market integration in services has always fallen behind  the deepening of the 
internal market in goods ; it has also been less wide in scope and less firm. It is only in the last two 
decades that the CJEU and, more hesitantly, the EU legislator have begun to address the barriers in 
earnest. In the context of the present contribution, the focus will merely be on aspects relevant to 
MR, thereby inevitably leaving out many other interesting elements needed for a fuller appreciation 
of the gradual emergence of a functioning internal services market. The present section will discuss 
what is called "horizontal services liberalisation": the achievement of free movement and the 
effective exercise of the right of establishment in sectors which are regulated only relatively lightly. 
The term suggests that the EU legislator (Council & EP) would not need to regulate or perhaps only 
with 'minimum harmonisation'. The CJEU should be able to ensure these economic freedoms, 
possibly with MR as well. Section 7 will briefly discuss MR in (vertically) regulated services such as 
financial services, transport and professional services.  
 
CJEU case law in services is complicated and, at times, confusing.35 The following cannot be but a 
stylized presentation of its logic. The CJEU has gradually tightened its rulings with the effect of  
disciplining more effectively national services regulation in the internal market. It is useful to keep 
Figure 3 (on goods) in mind because the analogy with services is close. If we ignore the objective of 
investor and saver protection – which falls under vertical regulation of financial markets anyway, 
hence not under horizontal liberalisation -  the objectives Member States pursue in national services 
                                                 
35 The reader is referred to surveys such as Andenas & Roth, ed.s (2001), Hatzopoulos & Do (2006) ; 
Hatzopoulos (2008), Maydell (2008), Snell (2008),  Barnard (2008) and Klamert (2010). 
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regulation amount to SHEC. But this is not nearly as clearcut as it is in goods, and case law also goes 
beyond SHEC.  In the treaty section on services, there is no article comparable to Art. 36, TFEU 
(identifying specific derogations) ; in the treaty section on establishment, Art. 52, TFEU only specifies 
derogations on the general grounds of "..public policy, public security or public health".  Provisions 
on the economic freedoms are similar to that in goods (i.e, Art. 34, TFEU), without employing the 
convoluted wording "measures with an equivalent effect to .. quantitative restrictions". Art. 56, TFEU 
states that ".. restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Union shall be prohibited..".  It is 
the same in Art. 49, TFEU : "… restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member 
State in the territory of another Member State shall be prohibited".  Establishment is also subject to 
'national treatment' (Art.s  49, 54 and 55, TFEU). If derogations to the free movement of services are 
applied, non-discrimination is compulsory (Art. 61, TFEU). Note that all these provisons have never 
been revised since 1957.  
 
In case law on services, the lack of detail in the treaty has had two crucial consequences, apart from 
an initial hesitation on the part of economic agents to challenge restrictions imposed by Member 
States. First, hindering or blocking free movement of services or establishment was initially assessed 
by the CJEU with a view to direct or indirect discrimination.  
One might say that national services regulation was gradually 'cleansed'  from discriminatory 
provisions, a much needed but nonetheless modest achievement.36 Second, with almost no 
specifications on possible derogations, a body of  'rule of reason'  justifications was built up, regarded 
as "imperative reasons relating to the public interest" or, much the same, "imperative requirements 
in the general interest".37  Over time, the list has become quite long and the wording is often rather 
general.38 One may indeed argue on the grounds of legal certainty or for the deepening of the 
internal services market that the treaty ought to be revised yielding more specific guidance, and/or 
secondary EU law be enacted (in other words, a more active and agile EU legislator, creating 
legitimacy for the rules and unburdening the CJEU from such creative constructions). Sooner or later, 
a more sweeping approach was bound to emerge since early case law kept numerous barriers in 
place. In order to understand the essence of the greater determination since the beginning of the 
1990s, two modes of disciplining national regulation are important : disciplining 'restrictions' and the 
                                                 
36  Note that, in exceptional instances, and based on a strict CJEU interpretation, discriminatory provisions 
may be justified for 'public policy, public security or public health' under Art. 52, TFEU.  
37 The first formulation can be found in e.g. Case C-58/98 Corsten [2000] ECR I-0000 para 35 ; the second 
in e.g. Case C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I-4165 para 39. 
38 Known as the 'general good' approach framed in very broad objectives, and subsequently assessed 
strictly, it includes e.g. intellectual property, consumer protection, protection of workers, conservation of 
national heritage, sound administration of justice, cohesion of the tax system, requirements of road safety, 
the financial balance of the social security system and language requirements (for dentists, in the interest 
of patients). The reader will observe that many of these are inspired by the approach in goods.  
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'country-of-origin-principle'. The first one became more prominent since the Saeger ruling (1991) and 
also plays a role in the services directive 2006/123, whereas the second one is employed in the e-
commerce directive, the TV-without-frontiers directive  and the Bolkestein draft directive.  
The Saeger ruling 39 sharpens CJEU case law by employing language reminiscent of Dasssonville : "… 
Art. *now 56, TFEU + ..requires…the abolition of any *non-discriminatory+ restriction … liable to 
prohibit or otherwise impede the activities of a provider of services established in another Member 
State where he lawfully provides similar services".  Wording like "less advantageous" or "more 
difficult" has also been used. Observe that this ruling disciplines restrictions but does not go as far as 
Cassis-de-Dijon where the origin principle is first pronounced. Nevertheless, the difference is slim 
because 'otherwise impede'  or 'more difficult' casts the net very wide indeed. Both in Cassis-de-
Dijon (see Figure 2) and in Saeger, it is really the justified derogations which matter, but the set of 
derogations in services seems larger. Subsequent case law (and to some extent, already before) 
strictly analyzes the application of derogations, in analogy with the central box in Figure 3. If non-
discriminatory, measures have to be necessary 40, proportionate ( "not go beyond what is 
necessary")41  and, what comes  close to the same thing, "it must not be possible to obtain the same 
result by less restrictive rules" 42.  
 
In a third step (in analogy with Figure 3, right-bottom box), the CJEU tests for a simple form of MR via 
explicit proofs  such as (identical) tests on standards, licensing and its conditions or approvals in the 
EU country of establishment of the provider. Rather than  MR of precise 'objectives', the CJEU refers 
to the 'public interest' as pursued in the country of origin. Thus, the treaty freedom to provide 
services "may be restricted only by rules justified by the public interest… in so far as that interest is 
not safeguarded by the rules to which the provider of such a service is subject in the Member State 
where he is established".43  In the Mediawet case44 the Court held that restrictions of the freedom to 
provide services are prohibited "… if the requirements embodied in that legislation are already 
satisfied by the rules imposed on those persons in the Member State in which they are established".  
In a simpler form e.g. by forbidding duplication of tests or a new certificate of solvency45 or 
guarantees already furnished by the provider in his home country,46 this  MR test goes back three 
                                                 
39 Case C-76/90 [1991] ECR I-4221. 
40 In Saeger, the CJEU speaks of "objectively necessary" ; in Case C-222/95 Parodi  [1997] ECR I-3899, para 
31, the wording is "indispensable for attaining the objective pursued". 
41  For example, in Case C-424/97 Haim [2000] ECR I-0000 para 60  and many other ones. 
42  Case C-288/89 Mediawet I [1991ECR I-4007 para 15  
43 From Case C-355/98 Commission vs. Belgium [2000] ECR I-1221, para 37. Similar wording can be found 
in the Saeger case and many other cases. 
44 Case C-288/89 Mediawet [1991] ECR I-4007, para 13. 
45 In the  German insurance cases : Case C-205/84 Commission vs. Germany [1986 ] ECR 3755, para 37] 
46 Case C-279/80 Webb [1981] ECR 3305, para 20.  
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decades. The main effect of the gradual sharpening and widening of this MR test during the 1990s 
and later was to stimulate economic agents to reveal (by going to court) the many restrictions they 
were subjected to. The increasing awareness of a thick and very wide web of restrictions in the 
internal services market eventually led to the  2002 Commission  report47 on those barriers, as a 
stepping stone for the draft Bolkestein directive.48  
 
The underlying conviction of the Bolkestein draft was that case law would not suffice to establish a 
well-functioning internal market for services and that the EU legislator had to act firmly. The 
'restrictions' approach was replaced by the more radical origin principle (= CoOP) in Art. 16: 
"Member States shall ensure that providers are subject only to the national provisions of their 
Member State of origin which fall within the coordinated field". This 'field' was widely drawn49 and 
the origin country was to be responsible ".. for supervising the provider and the services provided by 
him, including services provided by him in another Member State." (Art. 16/3). Given the CoOP, the 
design of the directive consisted in  accompanying it with a complicated list of various types of 
derogations, and, in a few instances, harmonisation (in consumer protection, simplification of 'red 
tape' and two black lists, one for free movement restrictions and one for restrictions of the right of 
establishment). Realizing that the CoOP and its supervision provisions would require a high degree of 
mutual trust between Member States, far-reaching provisions about administrative cooperation 
between EU countries were introduced by organizing the allocation of supervisory tasks, exchange of 
information and mutual assistance.50 The economic impact of the CoOP in this design hinges critically 
on (a) whether EU countries impose sufficiently different regulatory requirements to the services 
falling within the coordinated field (if not different, MR would do; if different or revised to lower 
them in some countries, the question becomes whether market failures will be re-introduced, hence, 
the public interest would be harmed, without having a duty to harmonize); (b) the number and 
importance of the derogations specified in the directive (indeed, such a radical approach forms a 
standing invitation to lobbies or Member States to insert more derogations, which is exactly what 
happened). On the first point, based on Kox & Lejour (2005) 's  regulatory heterogeneity index for 
intra-EU services,  De Bruijn. Kox & Lejour (2007) show that the CoOP as originally envisaged in the 
draft would significantly reduce intra-EU regulatory heterogeneity for intra-EU services trade. Since 
                                                 
47  COM (2002) 441 of 30 July 2002, The state of the internal market for services.  
48 COM (2004) 2 of 13 January 2004, Proposal for a directive on services in the internal market. 
49 Art. 16/2 stated ".. national provisions relating to access to and the exercise of a service activity, in 
particular those requirements governing the bahaviour of the provider, the quality or content of the 
service, advertising, contracts and the provider's liability." 
50 The draft also encouraged the drawing up of EU-wide 'codes-of-conduct', provisions which survived the 
turbulent legislative process all the way to directive 2006/123. For the meaning of such provisions, see 
Delimatsis, 2010.  
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such heterogeneity entails fixed entry costs for providers for each Member State of destination, the 
fall of the index due to the CoOP yields extra trade growth  and jobs. On the second point, once 
derogations multiply, the relevant 'field'  shrinks to services with relatively few serious obstacles and 
the CoOP largely looses its purpose. It also matters what eventually happens with these derogations. 
In one politically prominent but economically minor instance, cross-border health services, a 
separate vertical directive has been proposed 51 and adopted after much debate by the European 
Parliament on 19th January 2011.  Other specific draft directives are likely to follow (e.g. on security 
services). 
 
There are many reasons why the Bolkestein strategy failed and a modest reformulation of Art. 16 
was opted for. The reader is referred to the literature.52  But two considerations are worth 
mentioning here. One is whether the CoOP in the Bolkestein draft was really identical to that 
introduced in a few previous directives (see also Klamert, op. cit.). Art. 3/2 of the e-commerce 
directive53 stipulates that ".. Member States may not…restrict the freedom to provide information 
society services from another Member State". Clearly, this is not identical to the Bolkestein draft : 
dependent on the derogations, this is a narrower or wider application of the restrictions approach. 
Similarly, in the TV directive, now revised as the Audiovisual Media Services directive,54 Art. 2a sets 
out the so-called 'country of transmission' principle :  Member States ".. shall ensure freedom of 
reception and shall not restrict retransmissions…of audiovisual services from other Member States..".  
Again, some derogations follow, of course. Apart from the legal issue of national courts having to 
interpret the rules of origin countries under the Bolkestein formulation, and not in the two directives 
quoted here, one wonders whether a far-reaching degree of discipline of restrictions is economically 
very different from a CoOP approach with (too) many derogations. The second consideration is about 
the derogations in the Bolkestein draft. Apart from derogations due to sectoral regulation  and other 
enumerated instances, one would expect the derogations having emerged from case law on services 
to be respected. However, this was not the case : no reference or explicit summary was included, 
which left the very general derogations based on public policy, public security or public health from 
the treaty as the only ones applicable. This caused a lot of consternation : can secondary EU law 
override case law (normally, not) and, just as important, does all this imply that this  case law did not 
                                                 
51 COM (2008) 414 of 2 July 2008, Proposal for a directive on the application of patients' rights in cross-
border health care.  This draft directive remains rather close to established case law. 
52  See the references in footnote 36 and e.g. Nicolaidis & Schmidt (2007),  Pelkmans (2007b) and Chang, 
Hanf & Pelkmans (2010). 
53  Directive 2000/31/EC, OJEU L 178/1  of 17 July 2000. 
54  Dir. 2007/65/EC of 11 Dec. 2007, amending Dir. 89/552/EEC, OJEU of 18 Dec. 2007, L 332/27.  Note 
that para 27 of the Pre-amble says that the CoOP should remain the core of the directive. 
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refer to market failures, hence, had always been unjustified? However, if both these questions are 
answered in the negative, the economic meaning of the CoOP would be curtailed and a degree of 
legal uncertainty would not help the internal market. MR does not entail these problems because of 
the basic idea of 'equivalence'. However, MR beyond what case law in services had achieved, would 
almost certainly require minimum harmonisation in a range of services, going against the very idea of 
horizontal liberalisation.  
 
Dir. 2006/123 removed the CoOP from the draft and replaced it with a restatement of the treaty 
rules and some case law. Art. 16/1 says that "Member States shall respect the right of providers to 
provide services in a Member State other than in which they are established … *and+ .. ensure free 
access and free exercise of a service activity within its territory". Restrictions are subject to non-
discrimination, the necessity test and the proportionality test as case law does. After specifying a 
black list of seven restrictive measures, Art. 16/3 is now explicit on the derogations from the treaty  
(public policy, security or health) and adds two: environment and employment conditions (incl. 
collective agreements). This is remarkable, to say the least. In a clause merely (re)stating the freedom 
to provide services in the internal market (and not the CoOP), a huge list of established case law 
derogations  are simply left out. Some of these are dealt with by the black lists of restrictions on free 
movement (Art. 16/2) and on establishment (Art. 14), but otherwise this set-up is simply aggravating 
legal uncertainty. The hope is that the extensive screening of national (and local !) regulation up to 
2008 inclusive as well as the 'mutual evaluation' between Member States conducted in 2010 has 
done away with most of the reasons why, once, the case law was developed.55  Finally, it is 
regrettable that Art. 16/1 does not explicitly mention a basic form of MR, namely, in close 
cooperation with other Member States, the duty to verify provisions in EU countries of origin as well 
as their supervision. There are different ways of  specifying this duty, the most rigorous one being the 
analogy with Figure 4 on the Mutual Recognition directive for goods, assigning the burden of proof to 
the Member State where the service is provided. A partial compensation of this omission is found in 
the provisions on administrative cooperation, going much further than CJEU case law. Art.s 28 and 29 
of the directive are useful in underlining the cooperative obligations of the country where the 
                                                 
55  In its report on Mutual Evaluation, the Commission holds that Member States, alone, together and with 
the Commission, have achieved a lot: "… a major step forward in terms of removing barriers and the 
modernisation / simplification of legislation. Hundreds of discriminatory, unjustified or disproportionate 
requirements existing throughout the EU have been abolished in important service sectors  such as retail, 
the services of the regulated professions, the construction sector, the tourism or business sector. This has 
been carried out via more than 1000 implementing laws…[  ]..Many Member States have also set up 
specific mechanisms to prevent new barriers from emerging in the future…". COM(2011) 20 of 27 Jan. 
2011, Towards a better functioning Single Market for servics – building on the results of the mutual 
evaluation process of the Services directive, p. 4.  For details, see the extensive survey of all Member States 
in SEC(2011)102 of 27 Jan. 2011,  Accompanying Document  (to COM(2011) 20 ). 
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provider is established. Called 'mutual assistance', it goes some way towards MR. This is going to be 
supported by the (electronic) Internal Market Information system (for the national officials), which 
has meanwhile begun to operate for a number of internal market purposes. What is lacking in these 
two articles is the emphasis on the duty of the country where the service is provided, to verify details 
in the origin country and finding them wanting, with a formal reasoned decision and  appeal options, 
before imposing restrictions in the first place. That obligation would render it similar to the measures 
in Figure 4 ensuring MR for goods.  
 
7.   Mutual recognition in EU sectoral services regulation 
The present section will remain brief on the application of MR in sectoral EU services regulation.  In 
financial markets, transport and professional services, MR has assumed meanings and forms 
somewhat distinct from horizontal MR.  Financial market liberalisation and EU regulation (as well as 
supervision) has gone through four stages. The first stage only concerned the right of establishment, 
took place during the 1970s  and hardly induced cross-border intra-EU financial market liberalisation. 
During the EC1992 process, the free movement of services was tackled in a novel way. With 
exchange restrictions removed by 1988, the financial markets regime built by 1992 consisted mainly 
of directives ensuring 'sound' financial institutions such as banks, insurance companies and 
investment houses (merchant banks), based on solvency requirements, capital requirements, 
avoiding large exposures to single companies (or countries), etc. Market players' trust (including 
consumers) in the soundness of such institutions is critical : they themselves cannot verify that and 
this asymmetry of information is so important that it can be paralyzing for the internal financial 
markets. Once such institutions are very big, contagion might also occur and in that event financial 
stability might be impaired. Hence, for micro and macro economic reasons, the EU had to arrange 
common minimum rules on supervision, too. The novel aspect was the move from host to home 
country control (of the supervision of banks,etc.). It works as follows:  the home country of a bank 
(where the headquarters is established) is obliged to supervise, following the EU rules, and cooperate 
in a joint EU Committee of national supervisors ;  in order to establish and maintain mutual trust, 
information (on those banks, etc.) will flow freely and fully in the Committee whenever needed. 
Based on these provisions, the bank receives a kind of 'EU passport' to do business anywhere in the 
EU, and if that is done with subsidiaries, the supervision of the home country is "mutually 
recognized" by the host country of the subsidiary.  
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During the second stage, the services as such in the four financial markets ( banking, insurance, 
investment services and asset management) were usually not EU regulated, with the exception of 
consumer credit  and mutual funds.  
 
The third stage consisted of the EU Financial Services Action Plan (2000 – 2005) with a major 
upgrading programme in 43 Directives and Regulations, mainly on wholesale markets ( whilst 
tightening investment services, with far less host country control, a protectionist legacy of national 
stock exchanges56 and again, institutions. This time, much greater attention was paid to detailed risk 
assessment of many specific financial products.57  As we now know, the basics (e.g. on capital 
requirements)  were far too lax, however,  and have been tightened after the financial crisis. No less 
than three successive capital requirement directive upgrades are being legislated over 2010 and 
2011. Moreover, several financial players were unregulated (e.g. equity and hedge funds; credit 
agencies, which turned out to have been influenced by conflict of interest), a number of new 
financial products (e.g. CDS) contained huge and hidden risks and the EU supervision cooperation 
failed hopelessly. The fourth stage (since 2008) is repairing these flaws and omissions with a flurry of 
new EU legislation as well as (slightly more centralized) common supervision in the European System 
of Financial Supervisors, plus a new body for permanent surveillance of financial stability (the 
European Financial Stability Board).  Whether this is going to be sufficient is as yet unclear. The much 
greater emphasis on risk assessment (see e.g. the Solvency II insurance directive with thousands of 
pages of applications at the 3rd level of implementation, to be available by 2012) and the much 
needed centralisation for 50 or more European (rather than national ) banks would seem to be 
inevitable for sound functioning of financial markets in Europe and for trust of market players  to 
return. 
 
The form and details of MR in financial markets require a high degree of mutual trust, not least 
because during the financial crisis it turned out that national supervision had been too lax and 
cooperation between national supervisors was deficient, to the point of breaking down when it 
mattered most. Greater centralisation in combination with stricter (and more uniform) EU rules 
seems to be the only way to ensure renewed mutual trust, but, ironically,  that also leaves less scope 
for MR.  
 
                                                 
56 Especially the MIFID directive : Dir. 2004/39/EC, OJEU L 145/1 of 30 April 2004. See e.g.  Casey & 
Lannoo (2006)   
57  In the so-called Lamfalussy procedures, levels of 2 and 3 would regulate numerous risk assessment 
models or methods. This was also linked to practical aspects of Basel II (on capital requirements). Thus, 
again, the products themselves were not regulated, but now their risks were addressed, technically.    
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In transport services, regulation is more limited, that is, mainly safety rules for transport equipment, 
environmental rules  and minimum qualifications of firms and persons providing services (as well as 
strict rules for working hours while flying, riding or driving). Again, licensing and supervision of safety 
and environment is national (although the latter can of course be randomly inspected by other 
Member States)  and mutually recognized. In this sector, the MR system seems to work well. This is a 
major achievement. The treaty calls for a common transport policy but this has anything but the 
characteristics of a heavy, imposing set of rules and prescriptions. 58 Quite the contrary, focussing on 
essential regulation only and combined with MR of home-country-control, a relatively smooth and 
highly competitive single transport market has emerged. Only rail freight is moving only slowly. 
 
In professional services, the rules are national. More often than not, these rules are a mix of public 
regulation and private codes of conduct, with internal sanctioning regimes for purposes of reputation 
and consumer trust. Because of this mix, it is exceedingly hard to unravel the possibly anti-
competitive elements from the ones justified by market failures. This is rendered even more difficult 
due to the nature of these services consisting of 'experience' goods (but not always with repeat 
purchasing) or 'credence goods' with strong asymmetries of information. Following the powerful 
Europeanisation of business, professional services are much more active across borders than one or 
two decades ago and therefore less resistant to a gradual Europeanisation of codes of conduct. Still, 
codes as well as national regulation frequently maintain idiosyncratic characteristics which tend to 
segment the internal market and render cross-border services expensive or impossible. The sector 
has long attempted to apply MR to its diploma's. Art. 53, TFEU employs the term 'mutual recognition' 
for this purpose ever since the Rome treaty. At first, this MR lacked any credibility, due to a lack of 
trust, a lack of willingness on the part of providers ( presumably, a protection of 'their' markets)  and 
a lack of demand from European business. What was practiced, boiled down to "maximum 
harmonisation" in endless negotiations, resulting in a throttling of free movement or establishment. 
Since 1989 a new approach reflects a MR spirit, which has culminated in an overarching directive 
2005/36.59 It is based on an 'equivalence' approach, promotes more automatic recognition as well as 
simplification of red tape and organizes stronger inter Member State cooperation. A recent 
evaluation demonstrates the many lingering difficulties of various forms of recognition under the 
directive.60   
                                                 
58 In the late 1960s and 1970s, however, some EU countries were insisting on such an approach. 
59 On the recognition of professional qualifications, OJEU L 236 of 23 September 2005. 
60 Meeting report, Evaluation of directive 2005/36/EC, 13 Sept 2010, with annexes including comments 
from professionals themselves, on website DG Markt, European Commission, Markt-D4/IW D(2010) 
361557, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market , go to professional qualifications. 
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Diploma recognition is of course only one amongst several reasons why the internal market of 
professional services does not easily open up. The example of accountancy services, whether by 
persons or firms, is perhaps exemplary of the deep-rooted obstacles which have to be overcome. MR 
could never be expected to accomplish this without many other routes. 61  
 
8.  Conclusions 
Mutual recognition is a great invention of the EU. However, before it works beyond some obvious 
instances of disguised protectionism,62 MR requires considerable refinement. The EU has gradually 
developed judicial and regulatory MR in goods. The latter, in the forms of the New (and Global) 
Approach and the new (more horizontal) food legislation after 1985,  has been very successful over 
time. The 2008 Goods package contains what can be held as the completion of a system grown 
deeper and wider over more than 2 decades, with solid underpinning of mutual trust via 
accreditation in an EU-wide network and other improvements, not least at the EU external border. A 
remarkable, though little known, track in regulatory MR is the prevention of future regulatory 
barriers from arising in the internal goods market. The combination of an ever more effective 
approach to existing barriers and an intrusive and targeted pre-emption policy for future ones has 
effectively spared the single goods market a process of  destructive erosion.  
 
Judicial MR in goods has long remained somewhat problematic. It has worked quite well in the food 
sector but only very selectively in other areas. Business criticism in the 1990s was often bitter 
because the legal tradition of basing everything on case law completely missed out on the day-to-day 
reality in cross-border market access in the EU.63  Three types of costs were incurred by European 
business, severely discouraging the exploitation of MR (and hence losing a good deal of the potential 
benefits for the internal market). Once the Commission began to realize this, it started to 
complement a steady stream of infringement procedures with the building of MR governance 
together with the Member States and many stakeholders. The new governance edifice was 
accomplished in a decade via a highly consensual approach. Reg. 764/2008 on (judicial) MR was 
packaged together with the betterment of regulatory MR (see above).  
                                                 
61  See e.g. Philipsen, 2009 for an overview of the economics of accounting regulation in OECD countries, 
with much attention to the EU case. See also Delimatsis, op. cit.  
62 Remember the typical cases of Cassis de Dijon, Italian pasta of durum wheat, a Dutch refusal to import 
certain types of German bread or the French prohibition of aspartam in light-cola, etc. 
63
 One phrase used being that MR is "a phantom in the court room." 
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The new governance of judicial MR drastically reduces these costs and gives far-reaching legal 
certainty, inter alia via a reversal of the burden of proof for non-conformity of goods already allowed 
on the market in other Member States. Together with the high quality, yet competitive system of 
certification over the entire EU, and the expected consolidation of the Notified Bodies, market access 
in goods regulated only at the national level will significantly further improve and this should 
incentivize in particular SMEs keen (but deterred in the past) to operate in a range of countries in the 
single market.  
 
In services, MR  has assumed different forms. Therefore, it is hazardous to generalize. As far as 
horizontal services liberalisation is concerned, case law on the freedom to provide services in the 
internal market has long remained shallow. Over time, a stepwise logic comparable with (horizontal) 
goods liberalisation as in Figure 3 was developed. However, based on the inevitability of creating a 
philosophy of the (EU) 'general good', given the absence of any specification in the treaty, CJEU case 
law built up a huge list of 'rule-of-reason'  derogations, in turn disciplined (as in goods) by non-
discrimination, necessity  and proportionality. A modest form of MR was added, by insisting that 
provisions, guarantees, approvals, testing or licencing conditions in the EU country of origin had to be 
verified first. However, with an enormous increase in CJEU cases during the late 1990s and the five 
years thereafter, it became clear that barriers in the internal market for services were far too 
numeous and restrictive, for this case law to be effective. The Bolkestein draft directive responded to 
this observation by a design centred around the origin principle, more radically than applied before 
in some other directives. This failed in a highly turbulent process of legislation. Directive 2006/123 
would seem to be modest in its core Art. 16, but upon further reflection this is not clear at all.  The 
directive has removed the 'general good' derogations in a single stroke, except environment. It is 
now unclear what the status of these derogations will be, although it would be remarkable if the 
CJEU would revise its case law following this piece of secondary legislation. If these derogations still 
apply, Art. 16 means little. Moreover, many sectoral derogations were included in the text of the 
directive itself, shrinking the scope of the directive to relatively unproblematic areas. The directive is 
still valuable, if only because of the two black lists (both for services and establishment restrictions), 
the point-of-single-contact for business  and the elaborate administrative cooperation stipulated ( a 
soft form of MR). However, MR could have been pushed much further in that provisions similar to 
the MR Regulation in goods (Figure 4) – in particular, a duty on the country where the services are 
provided, to assume the burden of proof based on verification in the origin country, with reasoned 
decisions and appeal options – should have been included. Still, the mutual evaluation between the 
Member States has proven to be remarkably sucessful and has led to countless instances of removing 
barriers.  
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Finally, some attention is paid to MR in sectoral services regulation. In financial services and in 
transport, not the services tend to be regulated but the firms or market institutions providing 
services. It is the supervision of these provisions which is mutually recognized (home country control 
and an EU passport for establishment). The high degree of mutual trust of this approach necessitates 
tight cooperation, if not some centralisation, of the organisation. In transport, this seems to work, 
with less centralisation in road haulage  and more in air transport or rail. In financial services, several 
stages in building EU financial markets have not prevented the financial crisis. It has revealed that 
further tightened  and tougher rules with respect to risk management  are badly needed.  Also, 
better common supervision is a conditio-sine-qua-non for MR to be applied in a credible fashion. For 
professional services, the relevance of MR relates to diploma's. After fake attempts to apply MR 
(realizing 'maximum harmonisation' in endless negotiations, without much hope of any economic 
impact for cross-border services), a more MR-driven approach has been built up since 1989, 
culminating an overarching 2005 directive. However, to make this work effectively remains 
exceedingly hard. It might well be indispensable that EU-wide codes-of-conduct (also encouraged in 
the 2006 services directive) and further harmonisation be accomplished, possibly aided by EU 
competition policy, before genuine MR in this domain works. 
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